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We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which
of two alternatives is better for them. Voters can, however, acquire
some costly information about the alternatives. As the number of vot-
ers increases, individual investment in political information declines to
zero. However, the election outcome is likely to correspond to the in-
terest of the majority if the marginal cost of information acquisition
approaches zero as the information acquired becomes nearly irrele-
vant. Under certain conditions, the election outcome corresponds to
the interests of the majority with probability approaching one. Thus,
“rationally ignorant” voters are consistent with a well-informed elec-
torate. JEL D72, D82.
Keywords: voting, information acquisition, information aggregation.
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One of the most inﬂuential contributions of Anthony Downs’s An Economic
Theory of Democracy to the economic modeling of politics is the concept
of “rational ignorance.” Given that each individual voter has a negligible
probability of aﬀecting the outcome in a large election, voters will not have
an incentive to acquire political information before voting. In a situation in
which discovering their interests or “true views” takes time and eﬀort from
individual citizens, the result may be a failure of democracy to produce a
result consistent with the interests of the majority. In Downs’s words,
If all others express their true views, he [the voter] gets the ben-
eﬁt of a well-informed electorate no matter how well-informed he
is; if they are badly informed, he cannot produce those beneﬁts
himself. Therefore, as in all cases of individual beneﬁts, the in-
dividual is motivated to shirk his share of the costs: he refuses
to get enough information to discover his true views. Since all
men do this, the election does not reﬂect the true consent of the
governed. (Downs 1957, p. 246)
We can actually draw a distinction between two versions of the rational
ignorance hypothesis. The “weak version” is that individual voters, realizing
that each vote has a negligible probability of aﬀecting the outcome of the
election, invest very little or no eﬀort in acquiring political information. The
“strong version” is that the election outcome itself will not be more likely to
reﬂect the interests of the majority than, say, a fair coin toss. In this paper,
we develop a formal model that is consistent with the weak version of the
rational ignorance hypothesis, but contradicts the strong version.
A good deal of the literature on the inﬂuence activities of interest groups
assumes explicitly or implicitly that a decisive fraction of the electorate is
uninformed because individual voters have little incentive to get political in-
formation (see e.g. Becker 1983, Baron 1994, and Grossman and Helpman
1996). Becker (1985) argues that eﬃciency may be restored in the voting
market because of the activity of inﬂuence groups. Coate and Morris (1995)
point out that the reelection motive may induce incumbent politicians to be-
have eﬃciently unless voters are uncertain about politicians’ types. (In their
1view, and Becker’s, eﬃciency does not mean that transfers from the majority
to interest groups do not occur; it only means that those transfers are carried
out with minimum dead weight costs.) Closer to our point, Wittman (1989)
calls into question the idea that the costs of information fall on the voter
instead of on political entrepreneurs.
We provide a diﬀerent rationale for elections to reﬂect the interests of the
majority. In our model, there are no interest groups or active politicians.
Voters do not have access to free information. Instead, they may acquire
some information, at a cost. Crucially, acquiring poor information is cheap.
We show that, as the number of voters increases, voters acquire less and less
information. However, under some conditions detailed below, the outcome
of the election is very likely to correspond to the interests of a majority of
voters. Thus, the electorate may be quite well-informed even if individual
voters are (at least asymptotically) rationally ignorant.
We study an election in which “moderate” or “swing” voters do not know
which of two alternatives is better for them. Voters may acquire a costly
signal about the alternatives. The signal is correct with probability 1/2+x,
where x is chosen by the voter. We refer to x as the quality of the signal. The
cost of acquiring the signal is given by some convex function C(x). Our ﬁrst
three results describe information acquisition and information aggregation in
the context of this model.
Theorem 1 shows that the quality of information acquired by individ-
ual voters goes to zero as the size of the electorate increases. However, if
C0(0) = 0, then the quality of information is positive for an arbitrarily large
electorate. The reason is simple: the probability of being pivotal is not
exactly zero. (If the probability of being pivotal were zero, instrumentally
rational voting behavior would be unconstrained.) An example consistent
with our assumptions is C(x) = xγ, with γ > 1.
Theorem 2 provides an estimate of the limit probability of choosing the
best alternative. If C0(0) = 0 and C00(x) is bounded, this probability is
strictly larger than 1/2. If C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, this probability is actually
one. In the example above, this is the case as long as γ > 2. Successful
information aggregation is possible because the information acquired by each
moderate voter goes to zero but it does so slowly enough to allow the eﬀect
of large numbers to kick in.
2The conditions for successful information aggregation may seem restric-
tive. But it is reasonable to believe that voters are involuntarily exposed to
a ﬂow of political information in the course of everyday activities – a point
already acknowledged by Downs (1957, p. 245), who relies on the unwill-
ingness of voters to assimilate even freely available information in order to
support the rational ignorance hypothesis. If the function C simply reﬂects
the cost of “paying a little attention,” the conditions for successful informa-
tion aggregation do not appear unduly restrictive.
Theorem 3 shows that elections with information acquisition will be al-
most always very close. On one hand, elections must be close to keep indi-
vidual voters acquiring some information. On the other hand, the fact that
voters acquire vanishingly little information keeps elections close even as the
number of voters increases.
Our last result, Theorem 4, considers a variant of our model in which
voters receive an informative signal even if they do not invest any eﬀort into
acquiring political information. It comes as a mild surprise that, as long as
C0(0) = 0, voters will devote some positive eﬀort to information acquisition.
(Of course, whether or not there is information acquisition becomes asymp-
totically irrelevant, as the probability that a moderate voter casts a vote in
agreement with his “true views” is bounded below by a number larger than
one half.)
Taken together, we consider our results as an argument in favor of the
idea that elections tend to serve well the interests of the majority, even if the
rational ignorance hypothesis ﬁts well as a description of individual voters.
Our model is related to the literature on information aggregation in elec-
tions inspired by Condorcet’s jury theorem (e.g. Miller 1986, Young 1988,
Austen-Smith and Banks 1996, Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, Duggan and
Martinelli 2001). This literature typically assumes that there is some infor-
mation dispersed among the voters, while in our paper the distribution of
information arises endogenously through the actions of voters. Our result on
close elections is similar to a result by Feddersen and Pesendorfer, though
it is obtained for quite diﬀerent reasons (see the discussion in Section 5). It
is interesting to note that voting behavior with private information leads to
close elections under a variety of assumptions.
3Recently, Persico (1999) has proposed another model of endogenous in-
formation in collective decision making. In Persico’s model, the quality of
the signal is given; voters can either acquire or not acquire information. As a
consequence, in his model it is not possible to have arbitrarily large numbers
of voters acquiring arbitrarily poor information. Persico is concerned with
the optimal design of committees, i.e. the optimal selection of committee size
and voting rule, while we consider an environment where majority rule is op-
timal and concern ourselves with the positive issue of endogenous production
and aggregation of information in large elections.
This paper also bears relation with and is partly inspired by the work of
scholars of public opinion who have noted that, in the aggregate, voters seem
surprisingly well-informed about the choices they make (e.g. Converse 1990
and Stimson 1990). The apparent paradox of nearly uninformed voters and
a well-informed electorate is aptly described by the following passage:
There is no paradox in here: the combination of some political
knowledge with scores approaching zero on information tests sim-
ply attests to the astronomical size of the potential universe of
political information. (Converse 1990, p. 372)
2 The Model
We analyze an election with two alternatives, A and B. There are 2n + 1
voters (i = 1,...,2n+1). A voter’s utility depends on the chosen alternative
d ∈ {A,B}, a preference parameter t ∈ {tA,tM,tB}, the state z ∈ {zA,zB},
and the quality of information acquired by the voter before the election x ∈
[0,1/2]. Acquiring information of quality x has a utility cost given by C(x),
so the utility of a voter can be written as
U(d,t,z) − C(x).
At the beginning of time, nature selects the state and the type of each
voter. Both states are equally likely ex ante. Each voter’s type is equal to
tA with probability , to tB with probability , and to tM with probability
1 − 2, where 0 <  < 1/2. Voters’ types are independent from each other
and from the realization of the state.
4Each voter knows her preference type but is uncertain about the type of
other voters. Voters are also uncertain about the realization of the state.
After learning her type, a voter decides the quality of her information. After
deciding on x, the voter receives a signal s ∈ {sA,sB}. The probability of
receiving signal sA in state A is equal to the probability of receiving signal
sB in state B and is given by 1/2 + x. That is, the likelihood of receiving
the “right” signal is increasing in the quality of information acquired by the
voter; if the voter acquires no information the signal is uninformative. Signals
are private information.
The election takes place after voters receive their signals. A voter can
either vote for A or vote for B. The alternative with most votes is chosen.
Let
v(t,z) = U(A,t,z) − U(B,t,z).
We assume that
v(tM,zA) = −v(tM,zB) = r,
v(tA,zA) = v(tA,zB) = q,
v(tB,zA) = v(tB,zB) = −q
where r and q are two positive real numbers. Voters of type tA and tB
are “extremists,” who favor alternative A or alternative B regardless of the
possible circumstances or states. Voters of type tM are “moderates,” willing
to support alternative A or alternative B depending on the circumstances.
The cost function C is strictly increasing, strictly convex, and twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable on (0,1/2). We assume that C(0) = 0, so that ac-
quiring no information is costless. Note that C0(0) ∈ [0,∞). If C00(x) grows
unboundedly as x goes to zero, we use the notation C00(0) = ∞. Thus,
C00(0) ∈ [0,∞].
After describing the environment, we turn now to the description of
strategies and the deﬁnition of equilibrium in the model. A pure strategy is
a pair ax,av, where
ax : {tA,tM,tB} → [0,1/2]
is a mapping from a voter’s type to a quality of information x, and
av : {tA,tM,tB} × {sA,sB} → {A,B}
5is a mapping from a voter’s type and the signal received to a decision to vote
for A or for B. A mixed strategy for voter i is a probability distribution αi
over the set of pure strategies.
A voting equilibrium α (αi = α for all i) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium
in which no voter uses a weakly dominated strategy.
Clearly, an equilibrium strategy will only assign positive probability to
pure strategies such that ax(tA) = ax(tB) = 0 and, from elimination of weakly
dominated strategies, av(tA,s) = A, av(tB,s) = B for s ∈ {sA,sB}, so we
can restrict our attention to pure strategies satisfying those constraints. It
remains to determine the equilibrium behavior of moderate voters.
Let Pα1,...,α2n+1(A|zA) and Pα1,...,α2n+1(B|zB) be the probability of alterna-
tive A winning the election if the state is zA and the probability of alternative
B winning the election if the state is zB, for a given strategy proﬁle. Let
Eαi(C(xi)) be the expected cost of information acquisition for voter i given
her own strategy, conditional on her type being tM. Then, the ex ante utility










r + (1 − 2)Eαi(C(xi))
plus some constant term which we ignore hereafter. We refer to the term
in brackets as the probability of choosing the right alternative. We are par-
ticularly interested in the limit value of this probability as the size of the
electorate increases.
3 Rational Ignorance
In this section we describe the equilibrium behavior of moderate voters. We
show that, according to the weak version of the rational ignorance hypothesis,















Intuitively, this expression gives us the marginal beneﬁt of acquiring quality
of information x for a given voter when every other voter is acquiring x. The
6ﬁrst term in the deﬁnition of G is the probability that a given voter is pivotal
multiplied by the gain in reaching the right decision. The second term is the






0 if G(0) ≤ 0
1/2 if G(1/2) ≥ 0
G−1(0) otherwise.
The ﬁrst term in the deﬁnition of G is strictly positive and converges to zero
as n goes to inﬁnity for any sequence of x ∈ [0,1/2]. Thus, if C0(0) = 0, we
get G(x) > 0 for every x and then xM > 0. However, if we let n go to inﬁnity
while keeping , r and the function C constant, xM should converge to 0.









Note that for any n ≥ n(r,C), we get xM = 0.
We have
Theorem 1
(i) If C0(0) = 0, there is a unique voting equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the
pure strategy given by ax(tM) = xM, av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B is
played with probability one.
(ii) If C0(0) > 0 and n ≥ n(r,C), every equilibrium assigns probability one
to the set of pure strategies such that ax(tM) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that every voter other than i adopts the strategy α, and
let Pα(piv|zA) and Pα(piv|zB) be the probabilities that n voters other than i
vote for A and n voters other than i vote for B in state zA and in state zB,
respectively. The expected utility for voter i of adopting the pure strategy
ax(tM) = x, av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B for any x ∈ [0,1/2] is given



















r − C(x) (1)
plus a term that does not depend on the action chosen by i. Note that the
expected utility is a strictly concave function of x.
7We can show that, in equilibrium, it has to be the case that the pure
strategy with av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B is strictly superior to any
other pure strategy for a given choice x > 0 of information quality. For
suppose that it is not superior to the pure strategy with av(tM,sA) = A and





















Then, for every choice of information quality, every pure strategy such that
av(tM,sA) = B is strictly dominated by the pure strategy with av(tM,sA) =
A and av(tM,sB) = A. That is, voter i assigns probability one to the set of
pure strategies with av(tM,sA) = A. Now let β(x) be the probability that i
plays a pure strategy with av(tM,sB) = B and with quality of information
smaller or equal than x, as induced by voter i’s strategy. Let pA and pB be the
probabilities with which voter i votes for A in state zA and for B in state zB,
as induced by voter i strategy. Then pA = (1−2)(1−
R 1/2
0 (1/2−x)dβ(x))+
and pB = (1 − 2)(
R 1/2
0 (1/2 + x)dβ(x)) + . It follows that |pA − 1/2| ≥
|pB − 1/2|. But then, pn
A(1 − pA)n ≤ pn
B(1 − pB)n. Since equilibrium is
symmetric, we get Pα(piv|zA) ≤ Pα(piv|zB), a contradiction.
From the previous paragraph, we can restrict our attention to pure strate-
gies with ax(tM) = x, av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B for any x > 0.
From equation (1), if any such pure strategy is optimal for voter i, it is the
unique optimal pure strategy among strategies with ax(tM) = x, av(tM,sA) =
A and av(tM,sB) = B for any x ≥ 0. Moreover, the argument in the pre-
vious paragraph shows that Pα(piv|zA) = Pα(piv|zB). But this implies that
all pure strategies with no information acquisition have the same expected
payoﬀ. Thus, if there is some information acquisition, it has to be the case
that the voting equilibrium is a pure strategy equilibrium with ax(tM) = x∗,
av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B for some x∗ > 0.
Now, suppose that every voter other than i adopts the pure strategy with
ax(tM) = ˜ x, av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B for some ˜ x ≥ 0. Then the






( + (1 − 2)(1/2 + ˜ x))













Replacing these probabilities in equation (1), we get that the expected utility
for voter i of adopting the pure strategy with ax(tM) = x, av(tM,sA) = A















The ﬁrst derivative of this expression with respect to x is












The second derivative is negative for x > 0. Note that H(x,x) = G(x). Thus,
the distribution that gives probability one to the pure strategy ax(tM) =
xM, av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B constitutes a voting equilibrium.
Moreover, this is the only equilibrium in which information acquisition is
possible.
To check that, if C0(0) = 0, there is no equilibrium in which there is no
information acquisition, note that the probability of being pivotal is positive
for any choice of strategy by other voters. Thus, from equation (1), the
marginal beneﬁt of acquiring information is larger than the marginal cost
for x suﬃciently close to 0. Finally, if C0(0) > 0, we know that xM = 0
for n ≥ n(r,C). It follows that there is no equilibrium with information
acquisition for n ≥ n(r,C).
2
4 Information Aggregation
In this section, we let n go to inﬁnity while keeping the other parameters of
the model (, q, r) and the function C constant. We study the limit behavior
9of the probability of choosing the right alternative along the sequence of
voting equilibria thus obtained.
From the previous section, we know that if C0(0) > 0, there is no infor-
mation acquisition for n large enough. Thus, the probability of choosing the
right alternative converges to 1/2 – the only possibility for an uninformed
electorate since the two states are equally likely. However, if C0(0) = 0, mod-
erate voters acquire some information for every n. In this section we show
that, if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, the quality of information acquired by moderate
voters declines slowly enough to allow the probability of choosing the right
alternative to converge to one. In other words, even though in the limit vot-
ers are rationally ignorant, the electorate is quite well informed. If C0(0) = 0
and C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞), some information aggregation is still possible; in
this case the limit value of the probability of choosing the right alternative
increases with r/c (the gain of choosing the right alternative divided by the
limit of the second derivative of the cost function). Finally, if C0(0) = 0 but
C00(0) = ∞, the quality of information acquired by voters declines very fast
so the probability of choosing the right alternative converges to 1/2.
As an example, consider the cost function C(x) = xγ, with γ > 1. Theo-
rem 2 below establishes that for γ < 2, the probability of choosing the right
alternative converges to 1/2. For γ = 2, the probability of choosing the right
alternative converges to some value between 1/2 and one. (This value is
about .7412 for r = 1 and  close to zero.) For γ > 2, the probability of
choosing the right alternative converges to one.
If C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞), let k(,r,C) be the solution to
k/φ(k) = 4(r/c)(1 − 2),
where φ is the standard normal density. Note that k(,r,C) ∈ (0,∞), and
moreover, k(,r,C) is increasing in r/c and decreasing in . As we will see
below, k(,r,C) is an indicator of the information held by the electorate in
large elections. It is equal to the limit of the product of the information
acquired by each individual and the square root of the size of the electorate,
multiplied by a constant term.
10We have
Theorem 2
(i) If C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, the probability of choosing the right alternative
converges to one as the size of the electorate increases.
(ii) If C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = c ∈ (0,∞), the probability of choosing the
right alternative converges to Φ(k(,r,C)), where Φ is the standard normal
distribution.
(iii) If C0(0) > 0 or C00(0) = ∞, the probability of choosing the right alter-
native converges to 1/2.
We prove the theorem via two lemmas. In the two lemmas we write xn to
represent the value of xM (as deﬁned in the previous section) for a given n.
We know from the previous section that if C0(0) = 0, then xn is positive but
converges to zero as n grows to inﬁnity. The ﬁrst lemma tells us how fast
xn converges to zero in each of the three cases of the theorem. The second
lemma uses a version of the central limit theorem to establish the desired
results. A direct application of the central limit theorem is not possible
because the distribution representing the decision of a given voter changes
with n. Instead, we use a normal approximation result for ﬁnite samples, the
Berry-Esseen theorem.
Lemma 1
(i) If C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, then n1/2xn goes to +∞ as n grows arbitrarily
large.
(ii) If C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = c < ∞, then
limn→∞ n1/2xn = k(,r,C)/(2
√
2(1 − 2)).
(iii) If C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = ∞, then limn→∞ n1/2xn = 0.






































r = yn C
00(ξn) (2)







(from Stirling’s formula) and
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(because 0 < yn < n1/2).
Now consider the case C0(0) = C00(0) = 0. Suppose that along some
subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite L ≥ 0. Then, along the subsequence
the right hand side of equation (2) converges to zero. However, the left hand
side converges to a positive number, as can be seen from the fact that






→ exp{−4(1 − 2)
2L
2}
(see e.g. Durrett 1991, p. 94). Thus, yn diverges to +∞, which establishes
case (i).
Consider the case C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = c < ∞. Suppose that along
some subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite K ≥ 0. Following the steps of the
previous case, we get that K must satisfy π−1/2 exp{−4(1 − 2)2K2}r = Kc
or, equivalently, K = k(,r,C)/(2
√
2(1−2)). It remains to show that along
no subsequence yn diverges to +∞. To see this, note that the right hand
side of equation (2) grows without bound if yn goes to inﬁnity, while for any
positive δ, the left hand side is smaller than (π−1/2 +δ)r for n large enough.
This establishes case (ii).
Finally, consider the case C0(0) = 0 and C00(0) = ∞. If along some
subsequence yn converges to a ﬁnite L > 0 or diverges to +∞, the right hand
side of equation (2) grows without bound, while the left hand side is bounded
by the argument above. 2
12Lemma 2 Suppose that C0(0) = 0. If limn→∞ n1/2xn = K < ∞, the proba-
bility of choosing the right alternative converges to Φ(2
√
2(1−2)K), where Φ
is the standard normal distribution. If n1/2xn diverges to +∞, the probability
of choosing the right alternative converges to one.
Proof. Suppose the state is zA (similar calculations hold if the state is
zB). Given the equilibrium strategy described in Theorem 1(i), the event of
a given voter voting for A in state zA corresponds to a Bernoulli trial with
probability of success
(1 − 2)(1/2 + xn) +  = 1/2 + (1 − 2)xn.





1/2 − (1 − 2)xn if voter i votes for A,
−1/2 − (1 − 2)xn if voter i votes for B.
For each n, the random variables V n
i are iid. Moreover,
E(V
n



















Let Fn stand for the distribution of the normalized sum
(V
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i )2)(2n + 1).
Note that A loses the election if it obtains n or fewer votes, that is, if
V
n
1 + ··· + V
n




1 + ··· + V
n
2n+1 ≤ −1/2 − (2n + 1)(1 − 2)xn.
Then, the probability of A winning the election is 1 − Fn(Jn), where
Jn =
−1/2 − (2n + 1)(1 − 2)xn p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
.
13Now, from the Berry-Esseen theorem (see Feller 1971, p. 542 or Durrett
1991, p. 106), for all w,







The right hand side of the equation above converges to zero as n goes to
inﬁnity, so we obtain an increasingly good approximation using the normal
distribution even though the distribution of V n
i changes with n. Thus,
lim
n→∞|Fn(Jn) − Φ(Jn)| = 0.
If limn→∞ n1/2xn = K < ∞, then Jn converges to −2
√





2(1 − 2)K)| = 0.
Thus, the probability of A winning converges to 1−Φ(−2
√
2(1−2)K). The
desired result follows from symmetry.
If n1/2xn goes to inﬁnity with n, then Jn goes to −∞. Thus, for arbitrarily
large L, the probability of A winning the election is larger than 1 − Fn(−L)
for n large enough. Using the normal approximation above we can see that
the probability of A winning must go to one. 2
5 The Winning Margin
Deﬁne the winning margin to be a random variable representing the diﬀerence
between the number of votes for the winner and the number of votes for
the loser, divided by 2n + 1. In this section we show that, if C0(0) = 0,
the winning margin is likely to be close to zero for large electorates. In
other words, elections with information acquisition tend to be very close.
Intuitively, information acquisition requires that the probability of a voter
being pivotal should not decline too fast. Otherwise, voters would lose the
incentive to acquire costly information.
From the previous section, we know that, if C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, the
probability that the right alternative wins the election goes to one as the size
of the electorate increases. Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 below imply that, if
14C0(0) = C00(0) = 0, the percentage of votes for the right alternative will be
very likely to be barely above 1/2. The reason is that the distribution of the
percentage of votes for the right alternative concentrates very fast around its
central terms, near 1/2 + (1 − 2)xn, with xn going to zero as n increases.
We have
Theorem 3 If C0(0) = 0, then for any κ > 0 the probability that the win-
ning margin is larger than κ converges to zero as the size of the electorate
increases.
Proof. Suppose the state is zA (similar calculations hold if the state is zB).




1 + ··· + V
n
2n+1 + (2n + 1)(1/2 + (1 − 2)xn).
Then, the winning margin is
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.
Therefore, the probability that the winning margin is smaller or equal to κ
is equal to Fn(Dn) − Fn(In), where
Dn =
(2n + 1)(κ/2 − (1 − 2)xn)
p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
and
In =
(2n + 1)(−κ/2 − (1 − 2)xn)
p
E((V n
i )2)(2n + 1)
.
Note that Dn goes to +∞ and In goes to −∞ with n. Following the last
steps of the proof of lemma 2, we have that the probability that the winning
margin is smaller or equal to κ must go to one. 2
Theorem 3 is reminiscent of a similar result by Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997). In their work, the tightness of the electoral race is brought about by
15the fact that a vanishing fraction of voters takes into account their private
information when casting a vote. That is, only a small fraction of voters
takes informative actions in large elections. In our model, the fraction of
swing voters is constant because of our assumption that moderate voters have
common preferences. However, in large elections, the actions of individual
voters carry very little information.
6 Free Information
In this section, we modify the model presented in Section 2 by allowing
voters to receive some free information. In particular, we now assume that
the probability of receiving the signal sA in state A is equal to the probability
of receiving signal sB in state B and is given by 1/2 + δ + x for some δ ∈
(0,1/2). Acquiring additional information quality x ∈ [0,1/2−δ] has a utility
cost given by a strictly increasing, strictly convex and twice diﬀerentiable
function C(x) with C(0) = 0. Surprisingly perhaps, we get that voters




















0 if ˜ G(0) ≤ 0
1/2 − δ if ˜ G(1/2 − δ) ≥ 0
˜ G−1(0) otherwise.
Note that ˜ xM > 0 for arbitrarily large n if and only if C0(0) = 0.
We have
Theorem 4 In the model with free information, there is a unique voting
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the pure strategy given by ax(tM) = ˜ xM,
av(tM,sA) = A and av(tM,sB) = B is played with probability one.
The proof just follows that of Theorem 1. The only diﬀerence is that
moderate voters vote according to their signals even if they acquire no addi-
tional information. Of course, whether or not there is information acquisition
16becomes asymptotically irrelevant in the presence of free information. Since
the probability of a voter casting a vote for the right alternative is bounded
below by (1−2)(1/2+δ)+ = 1/2+δ(1−2), the probability of choosing
the right alternative must converge to one.
7 Conclusion
The representation of public opinion in our model is very sparse. There are
no media, interest groups or other political organizations; only voters who
may choose to acquire and process some arbitrarily poor information. In
this setting, we have shown that the electorate as a whole may be much
better informed than individual voters. In light of this, we believe that the
implications of “rational ignorance” for the behavior of the electorate as a
whole may have been exaggerated.
Akerlof and Yellen (1985) have argued that a small amount of nonmax-
imizing behavior by agents is capable of causing large changes in economic
equilibria, including in some contexts large welfare losses. In the political en-
vironment we study, a small deviation from rationality by voters – ignoring
completely the eﬀects of a single opinion – would have important negative
eﬀects on the responsiveness of collective decision making to the interests of
the majority. However, deviations from strictly rational beliefs may be as
likely to occur in the direction of overestimating the importance of a single
opinion as in the direction of underestimating it. This is a matter better left
for future research.
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